Posted September 8, 2014, by Edmund R. Folsom.
What Follows are a few updates and additions to my book “Maine Driver’s License Suspensions, Revocations and related Offenses (non-OUI),” that I have promised, for some time, to post:
Add to footnote 55, page 20, the following citation: State v. Spiegel, 2013 ME 73.
Amend Section 2.2(C)(2)(c)(1) ” Provisional License First Issued to Person Age 21 or Older,” to reflect the following:
Effective October 9, 2013, the language “without right to a hearing” is stricken from the governing statute, and the following language has been added: “If requested, the Secretary of State shall provide an opportunity for a hearing on the suspension as soon as practicable. After the hearing, the Secretary of State, for good cause shown, may continue, modify or rescind the suspension.”
Add to Section 2.2(C)(2)(g) “Negligent Causation of Death Suspensions,” page 52, after existing text:
Under authority of 29-A M.R.S §2458(2-A), the Secretary of State is to suspend for at least 3 years the license of anyone the Secretary of State finds recklessly or negligently operated a motor vehicle in a manner that caused the death of another person. The finding may be based on the Secretary of State’s records “or other sufficient evidence.” The suspension is to be imposed without preliminary hearing, but the Secretary of State must notify the person of a right to hearing under 29-A M.R.S. §2483. The Secretary of State is required to notify any family of the victim and is to consider, in its decision whether to issue the suspension, any written or oral statements received from the family. This statute leads to suspension of those who cause the death of another person through ordinary negligence. Suspension actions are often triggered by police officers, an accident victim’s family members or an attorney for the family providing police reports and other information to the Secretary of State.
Add new Section 2.2(C)(2)(h) “In Fact Causation of Serious Bodily Injury or Death While Knowingly Operating Under Suspension or Revocation,” as follows:
A person convicted of the Class C crime of knowingly operating a motor vehicle with a suspended or revoked driver’s license and in fact causing the death of another person is to have his or her license suspended by the Secretary of State for 5 years. A person convicted of the Class B crime of knowingly operating a motor vehicle with a suspended or revoked driver’s license and in fact causing the death of another person is to have his or her license suspended for 10 years.
Add to Section 2.2(D)(2) “Class E OAS,” page 54 at the end of the paragraph:
Although courts are not required to impose a suspension for conviction of this offense, the Secretary of State does impose a 60-day suspension upon receipt from the court of the abstract of conviction, as discussed in Section 2.2(C)(2)(b) above.
Add to Section 2.2(D)(3) “Operating While License Suspended for OUI or an OUI Offense,” page 56, first paragraph after “…for failure to satisfy reinstatement conditions”:
It should be noted that a person who has been granted a work-restricted license on an administrative suspension for a first-offense OUI does not commit the offense of operating after suspension for an OUI offense by operating outside the terms of the work restricted license. Once a work-restricted license is issued, the OUI suspension is stayed and the person is issued a license to drive for work purposes only. Because the person ‘s license is not suspended but is instead restricted at that point, operating beyond the work restriction constitutes the crime of operating beyond license restriction, under 29-A M.R.S. §1251(1)(B), not OAS for OUI. Similarly, it does not constitute OAS for OUI for a person to drive beyond the terms of a work-restricted license issued after the person serves 2/3 of the suspension period for a first offense OUI, under 29-A M.R.S. §2501, or for those who drive beyond license restriction after early reinstatement with an installed ignition interlock device, under 29-A M.R.S. §2508.
Add the following citation to footnote 242, page 60: State v. Spiegel, 2013 ME 73.
Add the following to the end of text at, page 119:
Note that even if a court finds that a prior conviction cannot be used to increase punishment because it was obtained in violation of the right to counsel, this finding does not allow a collateral attack to be made against a charge of operating after habitual offender revocation, even though the habitual offender declaration rests in part on the same uncounseled prior. The time to attack an habitual offender declaration is when the declaration is made, not after one has been charged criminally with driving in that status.
Updates to “Maine Driver’s License Suspensions, Revocations and Related Offenses.” 9/8/2013